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Abstract
This is a comment on the paper by Hagar and Hemmo (quant-ph/0512095)
in which they suggest that information-theoretic approaches to quan-
tum theory are incomplete.
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Quantum theory is a remarkably successful theory. There is little doubt
as to what quantum theory says, at least in simple situations; predictions
of quantum theory have been experimentally verified with great accuracy,
and no prediction of quantum theory is known to be incorrect. On the other
hand, there is no consensus as to what quantum theory means.
In a recent article [1], Hagar and Hemmo (henceforth H2) have discussed
the position, especially as set forth by Bub [2] and by Fuchs [3], that quan-
tum theory should be considered to be about quantum information, rather
than about quantum systems. H2 suggest that the story of “Wigner’s friend”
[4] would present a difficulty for this position, and in this note I wish to
comment on this suggestion. To avert a possible misunderstanding, I should
point out that H2 also emphasize that the experimental successes of quan-
tum theory do not rule out other theories which are, at least in principle,
empirically distinguishable from quantum theory (they cite the model of
Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber [5] as an example), but that is not the aspect
of their article upon which I will comment. For the purpose of this note, I
will take quantum theory to be empirically completely correct.
Here is a version of the story of Wigner’s friend, similar to the version
told by H2: A friend of Wigner’s enters a room, which is then closed; Wigner
remains outside. Inside the room is an electron, which has been prepared
with its spin along the x-axis, so that
|initial〉e = 1√
2
[| ↑〉e + | ↓〉e]. (1)
Here subscript e refers to the electron, and | ↑〉e (| ↓〉e) represent states
in which its spin is parallel (anti-parallel) to the z-axis. The room also
contains a machine, whose operation I will describe below, but which is
initially switched off and thus completely inert. After the room has been
closed, Friend measures the component of spin of the electron along the z-
axis. Wigner has been told that Friend would measure that spin component,
but he does not know the result of the measurement, so Wigner assigns the
following state-vector to the contents of the room:
|Ψ〉 = 1√
2
[| ↑〉e|sees ↑〉R + | ↓〉e|sees ↓〉R], (2)
where system R consists of the part of Friend which remembers the result
of the measurement, together with anything else (other parts of Friend, the
measuring apparatus, the air in the room...) with which that part may have
become entangled.
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I will discuss the two cases in which Friend does, or does not, switch
on the machine after he has measured the spin. If he does not, then the
machine remains inert, and so has no effect on the rest of our story. If the
machine is switched on, here is what happens: there is a pointer mounted
on the outside of the machine, which can point either to a mark “Y” or to
a mark “N”; when switched on, the machine interacts with the combined
system e ⊗ R with the result that if that system is described by the state-
vector given in eq. 2 (as in fact it is) the pointer points to “Y”, but if
the state-vector were orthogonal to that given in eq. 2, it would point to
“N”. Of course such a machine is completely impossible in practice [6], but
having made the assumption that quantum theory gives correct answers in
all circumstances, we are entitled to consider what would happen if such a
machine were actually to exist. And what would happen is that, if Wigner
enters the room after the machine has been switched on, he will surely see
that the pointer indicates “Y”. In contrast to this, in a “collapse theory”
such as that of [5], after the spin is measured by Friend, the state-vector of
e⊗R quickly collapses to either the first or the second term on the right-hand
side of eq. 2, which would imply that the pointer would indicate “Y” only
with probability 1
2
. Thus the machine, if it were to exist, could distinguish
between a collapse and a no-collapse theory.
Let us now consider what Friend thinks of all this. Suppose that Friend
determines the z-component of spin of the electron by looking at a measuring
device which displays either a “↑” or a “↓”, and that in fact it is the “↑”
which he sees displayed. He now wants to predict how the machine’s pointer
will point when he switches it on. He can certainly calculate (just as I have
done above) that Wigner will assign the state-vector written in eq. 2, and
that means that he knows that Wigner predicts with certainty that the
pointer will indicate “Y”; under the assumption that results predicted by
quantum theory are correct, this means that the pointer will indicate “Y”
[7]. In fact, even before Friend entered the room, both he and Wigner knew
that, as long as Friend would indeed measure the electron’s spin and then
turn on the machine, the pointer would indicate “Y”.
So far, so good. However, H2 suggest that information-theoretic ap-
proaches to quantum theory put Friend in danger of making “inconsistent
predictions”. Their argument leading to the (apparent) inconsistency is that
Friend, having seen the result “↑”, should “collapse” the state-vector given
in eq. 2 to get
Ψcollapsed = | ↑〉e|sees ↑〉R, (3)
and then should use this collapsed state-vector to predict that the pointer
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would indicate “Y” only with probability 1
2
; this would indeed be inconsis-
tent with the prediction that the pointer would indicate “Y” with prob-
ability 1. H2 argue further that the only way to avoid this inconsistency
while maintaining an information-theoretic approach to quantum theory is
to make assumptions about what would happen to Friend’s memory during
its interaction with the machine; since these assumptions lie outside of that
approach, H2 conclude that an information-theoretic approach, if it is to
avoid inconsistency, must be incomplete. H2 write that, in the information-
theoretic approach, “the assignment of quantum states becomes (in some
circumstances) ambiguous,” i.e. that Friend might assign to the e⊗ R sys-
tem either of the state-vectors Ψ (written here in eq. 2) or Ψcollapsed (eq.
3). I will argue below that neither of these assignments would be correct.
It is true that if Friend, before he switched on the machine, were to in-
form Wigner that he had observed the result “↑”, Wigner would base his
prediction for the pointer on the state-vector Ψcollapsed (and in that case
this new prediction would be the correct one, since the machine does not
interact with Wigner). But given that Friend does not so inform Wigner,
the state-vector Ψcollapsed would not be assigned by either one of them, so
it is not clear that there is any potential inconsistency to be avoided.
In any case, there is a way to exhibit some unusual aspects of Friend’s
situation, without having to consider at all what might happen to him or to
his memory during the interaction with the machine. Suppose that Friend
does not turn on the machine, but instead makes a second measurement of
the z-component of the electron’s spin. If the machine were not present,
it is an elementary result of quantum theory that this second measurement
would have the same result as the first (assuming of course that there were
no stray magnetic fields which might cause the electron to precess). Surely
the mere presence of the machine, if it is never switched on, would not alter
this result. Therefore Friend knows that this second measurement of spin
would surely have the result “↑”
Thus we see that, at a time after he has made the initial measurement of
the z-component of spin, but when he has not yet switched on the machine
A) Friend knows that if he switches on the machine, the result will be “Y”.
B) Friend knows that if he does not switch on the machine, but instead
makes a second measurement of the spin, the result will be “↑”.
Because the operator corresponding to the observable measured by the ma-
chine does not commute with the spin operator for the electron, these two
statements do not imply that Friend knows the result he would see if he
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first switched on the machine, and then made a second measurement of
spin. Nevertheless he is predicting with certainty the results of two in-
compatible measurements. Note that this conclusion does not depend on
any identification of state-vectors as representing information, nor indeed
on any commitment to what quantum theory means; statements A) and
B) are just what quantum theory says. Statement B) is an elementary-
textbook statement about a repeated measurement on a microscopic system,
while statement A) requires us to trust what quantum theory says about
(impossible-in-practice) measurements on macroscopic systems.
Statements A) and B) together imply that Friend cannot ascribe any
quantum state to the system e ⊗ R; there simply is no quantum state,
neither pure nor mixed, which is compatible with statements A) and B) [8]
The information which Friend has about the results of future measurements
on the e ⊗ R system does not correspond to any quantum state of that
system.
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[6] It would also be impossible in principle, unless the machine were allowed
to interact with anything with which Friend might be entangled, which
is why I chose to define the system R in the way I did. A more-usual
treatment would be to not mention this issue under the (almost-surely
correct) assumption that the reader already understands it.
[7] We could even go further and state that Friend therefore knows that if
he himself should look at the pointer after turning on the machine, he
would see it indicating “Y”.
[8] For a simple proof of this, let PΨ be the projector |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (where |Ψ〉
is given in eq. 2), let P↑ be the projector (| ↑〉e〈↑ |) ⊗ IR, and suppose
there were a density operator ρ for the e ⊗ R system. Then statement
A) would require
Probability(“Y”) = Tr(PΨρ) = 1, (4)
while statement B) would require
Probability(“↑”) = Tr(P↑ρ) = 1. (5)
Eq. 4 has the unique solution ρ = |Ψ〉〈Ψ| (again, |Ψ〉 from eq. 2), but
with that solution for ρ, eq. 5 reads 1
2
= 1.
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